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INTHEUTAHCOURTOF APPEALS

THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,
vs.
Case No. 20150218-CA
KRISTOPHER ENGLAND,
Appellant is incarcerated.
Defendant/Appellant.

INTRODUCTION
This case challenges the district court's restitution order. Mr. England unlawfully
sold a 1995 Eagle Talon without an engine to a junkyard for $300. The court ordered
him to pay as restitution the car's purchase price of $2,500 and the cost of improvements
that a mechanic claimed to have made to the car, totaling $8,277.87. This Court should
reverse the restitution order because the fair market value of the car was $300, the price
paid by the junkyard. In the alternative, $3,500, the price the mechanic quoted as the
value of the car with his improvements but without an engine is closer to a fair market
value established at the hearing. Even if this Court disagrees that the above figures are
appropriate, it should still reverse because the district court exceeded its authority when it
used the $2,500 purchase price of a 1995 car without an engine to begin its calculations
after acknowledging that the State did not provide evidence of fair market value.

JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT

This is an appeal from the district court's final order in a restitution hearing
following conviction and sentence for one count of theft, a third degree felony, in
violation of Utah Code section 76-6-404, in the Third Judicial District, Salt Lake County,
Utah, the Honorable Judge Charlene Barlow presiding. R. 108-09. A copy of the
sentence, judgment, and commitment is attached as Addendum A. A copy of the
restitution order and judgment is attached as Addendum B. This Court noticed after the
record for this case had been prepared that the district court's restitution order anticipated
further action from the State; the State then "demonstrated that the jurisdictional defect
has been cured" and in an Order Withdrawing Sua Sponte Motion for Summary
Disposition filed April 28, 2015, this Court ordered the appeal to proceed.
This Court has jurisdiction under Utah Code section 78A-4-103( e)(2).
ISSUE, STANDARD OF REVIEW, PRESERVATION

Issue: Whether the district court erred when it ordered restitution in an amount that
included the purchase price of a vehicle that had been stripped of its engine by the
mechanic as well as the purchase price of improvement projects.
Standard of Review: This Court will reverse a district court's order of restitution
when the district court "exceeds the authority prescribed by law or abuses its discretion.
Furthermore, whether a restitution award is proper depends solely upon interpretation of
the governing statute, and the [district] court's interpretation of a statute presents a
question of law, which this court reviews for correctness." State v. Brown, 2009 UT App
285, iJ 6, 221 P.3d 273 (alterations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
2

Preservation: This issue was preserved by counsel's motion objecting to the
restitution amount and argument at the restitution hearing. R. 125; 162:87-95.

STATUTES AND RULES
The following statutes are relevant to the issue on appeal: Utah Code§§ 77-38a102; 77-38a-202. Their text is provided in Addendum C.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
On December 9, 2013, the State charged Mr. England with theft and theft by
deception. R. 1-2. Mr. England pleaded guilty to theft as a third degree felony. R. 6774. He was sentenced to zero to five years in prison. R. 108-09. The State requested
restitution in the amount of $13,402.76 and Mr. England objected. R. 110; 125. The
district court ordered restitution in the amount of $8,277.87. R. 138-39. Mr. England
filed a timely appeal of the restitution order. R. 141.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
The declaration of probable cause in the information states that M.M. took a
vehicle to a shop to have work done on it. R. 2. Later, Mr. England told an employee to
sell the vehicle. R. 2. The employee sold the vehicle to Tear-A-Part for $300. R. 3. Mr.
England "stated that he never meant to rip anybody off." R. 3.
Mr. England pleaded guilty to theft as a third degree felony and was sentenced to
zero to five years in prison. R. I 08.
The Presentence Report states that M.M. explained to the investigator that he
"purchased the vehicle for $2,500 and he has receipts for an additional $7,000 he put in to
build the vehicle." R. 98.
3
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At the sentencing hearing, a statement was read on behalf of M.M., who has a
disability that limits his speech, stating that he "paid out $9,500 fixing this car" and that
to replace it "will cost about $14,000." 1 R. 163:15.
The record includes a letter from M.M. requesting $17,202.76, but that amount
includes a crossed out request for $3,800 in pain and suffering. R. 112. The State
submitted a motion for restitution in the amount of $13,402.76. Mr. England objected.
R. 125.
At the restitution hearing, the mechanic testified that he had owned the shop and
had been working on M.M. 's 1995 Eagle Talon for a year and a half. R. 161:7-10. He
estimated the Kelley Blue Book value of the car to be between $3,500 and $5,000,
although the State submitted as an exhibit a printout with an estimated Blue Book value
of between $1,666 and $2,311. R. 161: 1O; State's Ex. 1. M.M. had purchased the car for
$2,500. R. 161:15; 162:7.
The mechanic also testified that he had started several projects on the car. R.
161:9, 19. Some of the projects had not been completed because he was "waiting for the
engine to come back from the machine shop." R. 161:26. The mechanic explained that
he still had the car's engine at his house. R. 161: 34. He explained that, without the
engine but with his "work and modifications that car would have been worth at least
$3,500." R. 161:60.

1 The

sentencing transcript reads "$1,400," R. 163: 15, but the letter appears in the record
with the $14,000 figure. R. 113.
4

The mechanic presented six receipts with items including kits, sets, and
installation. State's Ex. 2, 4. The State and the court went through each receipt to
determine which items on it had been installed. R. 161:19-45. For example, the
mechanic testified that "paint and installation" is quoted on the receipt as "$4,500" but he
had not put on the top coat, which would have cost "$1,500." R. 161:24-25.
M.M. testified that he paid the amounts on the sales receipts to the mechanic,
although the parts were not given directly to M.M. and M.M. was never able to drive the
car while it was at the shop. R. 162: 12.
Mr. England called three witnesses who were familiar with the shop, either from
working there or from visiting it. R. 162:38, 40, 52. The woman who sold the car to the
junkyard testified that she never saw any boxed parts in the shop for the car. R. 162:35.
Another witness stated that she never saw any work done on the car. R. 162:43. Mr.
England testified that when he purchased the shop, he told M.M. he could not work on
the car because there was no motor. R. 162:65. He sold the car to the junkyard for $300,
which he considered a fair price and "about all you're going to get for that." R. 162:70.
Photographs of the car in the junkyard show it with no engine and without red paint, the
color indicated on the sales receipt. State's Ex. 2, 3, 5.
Mr. England argued that, without an engine, the value of the 1995 Eagle Talon
was $300. R. 162:87-91. The State backed off of the $14,000 "initial amount," saying,
"I'm not arguing for $14,000." R. 162:89. Rather, the State requested "the fair market
value plus the cost of everything that [the mechanic] installed." R. 162:91. The defense
argued that "we don't know if [the values M.M. paid for improvement projects were]
5

actually a good market value, if he ... overpaid .... We really don't have an
independent witness to tell us what this car was worth." R. 162:95. The court replied,
"Right. You didn't bring one, they didn't bring one. I have the mechanic." R. 162:95.
The court ordered that Mr. England owed $8,277.87 in restitution. R. 139. It
arrived at this figure by adding the purchase price of $2,500 to the improvements the
mechanic testified had been installed on each invoice. R. 138.

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
The $8,277.87 restitution award is incorrect. It was the State's burden to present
evidence of fair market value, and when the item in question is a car, purchase price is
not enough. The best figure for the fair market value of the property stolen, a 1995 Eagle
Talon without an engine, was $300. That was the amount the car sold for, and therefore
the amount the owner could have expected to receive and that a willing buyer would pay
for the stolen item.
Alternatively, the restitution award should not exceed $3,500. The mechanic
testified that, with his upgrades he believed the fair market value of the car without the
engine would be $3,500.
Finally, because the State did not provide a fair market value for the car without an
engine, the court erred when it used the purchase price of the car with an engine as a
baseline in its calculation of restitution.

6

ARGUMENT
II.

THE COURT ERRED WHEN IT AWARDED RESTITUTION
BASED ON THE PURCHASE PRICE OF THE CAR AND THE
PURCHASE PRICE OF EACH INSTALLED PROJECT.

As the State put it and the court confirmed, "the only thing" to be determined at
the restitution hearing was "the fair market value of the car that was stolen ... when it
was stolen." R. 161 :5. Utah's Crime Victims Restitution Act allows crime victims to
recover as pecuniary damages the fair market value of stolen property. Utah Code § 7738a-102(6), (11); State v. Brown, 2014 UT 48, iJil 21-22, 342 P.3d 239. "Fair market
value is measured by what the owner of the property could expect to receive, and the
amount a willing buyer would pay to the true owner for the stolen item." State v. Ludlow,
2015 UT App 146, ,r 6, 353 P.3d 179 (brackets omitted) (internal quotation marks
omitted). "It is the responsibility of the prosecutor to calculate 'the actual or estimated
amount of restitution."' Id.

,r 11 (quoting Utah Code§ 77-38a-202(1)-(2)).

"When a

plaintiff presents evidence of purchase price without demonstrating market value, the
plaintiff is entitled to only nominal damages." Id.

,r 12.

The district court erred in this case when, despite its acknowledgement that the
State did not present evidence of the car's fair market value, it used the purchase price of
the car (which, at the time it was stolen, did not have an engine) and added the purchase
price of every project the mechanic claimed to have installed. The court should have
awarded: (A) $300, which was the amount a willing buyer actually paid for the stolen
item; or (B) in the alternative, no more than $3,500, which was the amount the mechanic
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testified the item was worth at the time it was sold; or as a final alternative (C) the
awarded amount minus the car's purchase price.

A. The Fair Market Value of the Property Was $300.
The property in question was a 1995 Eagle Talon without an engine. R. 161:7-10,
34. "Fair market value is measured by what the owner of the property could expect to
receive, and the amount a willing buyer would pay to the true owner for the stolen item."

State v. Ludlow, 2015 UT App 146, ,r 6, 353 P.3d 179 (brackets omitted) (internal
quotation marks omitted). The fair market value was $300, which was the amount a
willing buyer paid for the stolen item. Mr. England testified that $300 was a fair price
and he could not have expected more. R. 162:70.
The purchase price for the car and the projects installed on it did not reflect fair
market value. In certain cases, "a purchase price may be appropriate to a determination
ofloss, in other cases it may not be appropriate." State v. Corbitt, 2003 UT App 417, ,r

4'1
15, 82 P.3d 211. In a case where "the date of purchase and the date the car was stolen
[were] only about two weeks apart[,] ... the use of purchase price" was "highly
appropriate." Id.

,r 15; cf State v. Ellis, 838 P.2d 1310, 1312 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1992) ("A

new car depreciates the moment it leaves the car lot and if it is stolen soon after it is
purchased, awarding the fair market value of the car would not make the victim whole.").
In this case, however, the car had been purchased used at least a year and a half before
the theft. R. 161:7-10. And it had been purchased with an engine and stolen after the
mechanic had removed the engine and brought it home. R. 161: 34; 95. The purchase
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price was therefore not appropriate or equitable in this case, even under a "flexible"
measure. Corbitt, 2003 UT App 417, ,I 9 (internal quotation marks omitted).
In Ludlow, "the majority of the stolen items were electronics of various ages that
would clearly have a market value." Ludlow, 2015 UT App 146, ,I 10. And it "is the
responsibility of the prosecutor" to establish market value. Id. ,I 11. The State and the
court cannot "shift[] the burden to [the defendant] to demonstrate fair market value" by
presenting only the purchase price of items with a discemable market value. Id. "When
a plaintiff presents evidence of purchase price without demonstrating market value, the
plaintiff is entitled to only nominal damages." Id. ,I 12. In Mr. England's case, the State
relied on evidence of purchase price. And a car, like electronics, "clearly [has] a market
value." Id. ,I 10; see also State's Ex. I (a printout of the Kelley Blue Book, which
estimates the value of cars). But, as in Ludlow, when Mr. England objected the court
shifted the burden:
[Defense counsel]: Our position would be that we don't knowfirst of all, [M.M.] testified what he paid. We don't know if that was
actually a good market value, if he paid- if he overpaid for it or not. We
really- we really don't have an independent witness to tell us what this
car was worth.
THE COURT: Right. You didn't bring one, they didn't bring one. I
have the mechanic.
R. 162:95.

The court's restitution order is based on the purchase price of the car and the
purchase price of the improvements. R. 138-39. But those figures were far removed
from the fair market value of the car. According to the State's exhibit, a 1995 Eagle
Talon in excellent condition with an engine could be sold for $2,311. State's Ex. 1. But
9

the court awarded M.M. the purchase price of $2,500 and added to it the purchase price
of every installed project, despite the absence of testimony concerning the fair market
value of those projects. This exceeded the authority prescribed by the Restitution Act
and this Court's case law.
The best evidence of the value a willing buyer would pay for the property at issue
in this case was the price a buyer did pay: $300. R. 162:70. The price was fair and
closely tied to the criminal conduct Mr. England admitted committing. It is the "fair
market value" of the car under the Restitution Act. Utah Code§ 77-38a-102(6). The
court exceeded its discretion when it awarded more.

B. Alternatively, the Court Should Not Have Awarded More than $3,500.
As argued above, the purchase price of the car and its improvements were not
appropriate in this case because those values did not reflect the value of a car a year and a
half later, after the mechanic had removed the engine. However, if this Court disagrees,
Mr. England argues in the alternative that the restitution amount should not have
exceeded $3,500.
When the State presents only evidence of purchase price for an item like a car with
a market value, nominal damages are appropriate. Ludlow, 2015 UT App 146, iJ 12. In
this case however, there was evidence of actual value, as argued above. There was also
testimony from the mechanic that the car with its improvements was worth $3,500. R.
161 :60. On cross examination, the defense asked the mechanic "even if some of those
parts were installed in the vehicle, without an engine, that vehicle is worth less than
$1,000?" R. 161 :59. The mechanic said he would "strongly disagree" because "it was
10

only being improved on." R. 161 :59. The court then asked, "If [M.M.] came to you and
said, 'I don't want it anymore, it's not worth the hassle anymore. You take it and sell it
for whatever you can get for it.' What do you think you would have been able to get for
it?" R. 161 :60. The question included "everything that was on the car," but "not the
engine, not what's in the boxes, just what was on the car." R. 161 :60. The mechanic
answered: "I would believe with all my work, labor, and everything and all the
modifications, that car would have had to have been at least worth $3,500." R. 161: 60.
The mechanic's testimony that the car would have been worth $3,500 is much
closer to evidence of fair market value than the purchase price of the car and the purchase
price of the projects. Although, as argued above, it is still high and is based on his
estimation of his own work, the $3,500 figure better reflects the price a willing buyer
would have paid for the car without an engine but with the installed projects. Ludlow,
2015 UT App 146, ,r 6. This is not a case where the stolen item was recently purchased
or where there was no resale market for the stolen property. In this case, the mechanic
provided testimony about what he believed to be the actual market value of the car at the
time it was stolen. The fair market value does not account for the sentimental value of
rehabilitating a "motor vehicle in progress," R. 162:95 (the court's description of the
Eagle Talon), but the Restitution Act specifically "excludes punitive or exemplary
damages and pain and suffering." Utah Code§ 77-38a-102(6), (11). The court exceeded
its discretion when it relied on purchase price instead of evidence of fair market value.
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C. The $2,500 Purchase Price Was an Inappropriate Baseline for the
Restitution Award.
Even if this Court disagrees that the district court exceeded its authority when it
awarded the purchase price of the installed projects, this Court should reverse the
restitution award because the purchase price of the car was not an appropriate baseline.
In Ludlow, this Court reversed a restitution award calculated using the purchase price of
stolen electronic items: "a Gateway laptop, a fourth generation iPod, a Droid X
smartphone, a Pioneer amp, two Kicker subwoofers." Ludlow, 2015 UT App 146, il 3
(alterations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). This Court held that the stolen
electronics had a market value different from the purchase price and that "the district
court should not have resolved the lack of evidence by granting the victim a windfall.
Rather, the court should have calculated the values of the items for which purchase price
provided an equitable approximation of value, if any, and awarded nominal restitution for
the remaining items." Id.

il 13 (citing Haycraft v. Adams, 24 P.2d 1110, 1112 (1933);

Utah Code§ 77-38a-102(1 l)). In Mr. England's case, even if this Court believes
purchase price was appropriate for the car improvements, it cannot have been appropriate
for the Eagle Talon frame. If purchase price is not appropriate for electronic items like a
laptop, an iPod, or a smartphone, Ludlow, 2015 UT App 146, il 3, which do not have the
well-known resale economy that cars have, it cannot be appropriate in this case. And it
certainly cannot be appropriate where the purchase price included the engine and the
stolen property did not. R. 161 :26. This Court should reverse the restitution award

12

because the district court exceeded its authority when it used the purchase price of the car
to calculate restitution.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons above, Mr. England respectfully requests that this Court reverse
the district court's restitution order.

SUBMITTED this 25 day of September, 2015.

NATHALIE S. SKIBINE
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant

.,
"'!
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ADDENDUMA

Tab A

3RD DIST. COURT - WEST JORDAN
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,

MINUTES
SENTENCE, JUDGMENT, COMMITMENT

vs.

Case No: 131401508 FS
Judge:
CHARLENE BARLOW
Date:
July 10, 2014

KRISTOPHER ENGLAND,
Defendant.
Custody: Salt Lake County Jail

PRESENT
Clerk:
pamf w
Prosecutor: HAMILTON, TYSON V
Defendant
Defendant's Attorney(s): HOWARD, WESLEY J
DEFENDANT INFORMATION
Date of birth: December 7, 1978
Sheriff Office#: 230221
Audio
Tape Number:
36
Tape Count: 11:05
CHARGES
1. THEFT (amended) - 3rd Degree Felony
- Disposition: 05/29/2014 Guilty
2. THEFT BY DECEPTION - Class B Misdemeanor
- Disposition: 05/29/2014 Dismissed

SENTENCE PRISON
Based on the defendant's conviction of THEFT a 3rd Degree Felony,
the defendant is sentenced to an indeterminate term of not to
exceed five years in the Utah State Prison.
To the SALT LAKE County Sheriff: The defendant is remanded to your
custody for transportation to the Utah State Prison where the
defendant will be confined.
SENTENCE RECOMMENDATION NOTE
Court recommends the defendant get into the Conquest Program at the
Prison. Court orders the defendant to pay restitution on all caes
including West Jordan City case 13H017891, restitution sent to B of
P. State to prepare motion and order for rest.

Credit is granted for 137 day(s) previously served.

Printed: 07/10/14 15:38:55

Page 1
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. ._

Case No: 131401508 Date:

Jul 10, 2014

SENTENCE JAIL CONCURRENT/CONSECUTIVE NOTE
Court orders this case is concurrent to case 131401296,

SENTENCE FINE
Charge# 1
Fine: $5000.00
Suspended: $5000.00
Surcharge: $
Total Fine:
Total Suspended:
Total Surcharge:
Total Principal Due:

$5000.00
$5000.00
$0
$0

Plus Interest
Date:

Printed: 07/10/14 15:38:55

Page 2 (last)
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ADDENDUMB

Tab B

~,,I

'•.,;.,-•

FILED

THIRD DISTRICT coup-

MAR O'J 2015
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, STATE CW~RDAN ..
SALT LAKE COUNTY, WEST JORDAN DEPARTMENT
' OtPl

STATE OF UTAH,

RULING ON MOTION FOR
Plaintiff,

RESTITUTION

vs.
Case No. 131401508

KRISTOPHER ENGLAND,

Judge:

Charlene Barlow

Defendant.
This matter came before the Court on December 11, 2014, and again on January 8, 2015, on
State's motion for restitution and defendant's objection to the amount of restitution. The Court
received evidence, testimony, and argument and took the matter under advisement. The Court
having reviewed the evidence and argument, hereby enters its ruling.
Restitution is defined as "full, partial, or nominal payment for pecuniary damages to a
victim[.]" Utah Code Ann. §78-38a-102(1 l). In this matter, defendant does not challenge that he
owes restitution but challenges the amount request by motion by the State of over $13,000. The
Court conducted a restitution hearing over two separate days and has arrived at the following
determination based on the evidence presented.
The victim, Michael Maus, testified that he paid $2500 to purchase an automobile to restore.
Further evidence from the person who worked on the restoration led to the following amounts:
Invoice 1001----body kit $482.09 and a paint job minus $1500 for the final coat which was not
applied ($3000); this adds up to $3482.09 plus tax of$238.52 for a total of $3720.61.
Invoice 1002----head light assembly set $345.36 plus tax totaling $369.02
Invoice 1003----All installed except the TXS-BOV-H-RFL and TCK-DSM-TD0516G plus tax
totaling $802.85
Invoice 1004----All installed totaling $595.95
Invoice 1005----Battery only plus tax totaling$ I 44.19
Invoice 1006----Wheel hubs only installed plus tax totaling $145. 25.

000138

These amounts are based on the testimony that some of the parts were not installed and are still in
the witness' storage; consequently, they may be available for sale to mitigate damages.
Adding all of these amounts, the Court finds that the restitution owing to Mr. Maus is
$8277.87.

ORDER
Based on the foregoing, the Court hereby ORDERS that defendant owes restitution in the
amount of $8277.87 to Michael Maus. The State is directed to prepare a final order for the Court's
signature.

DATED this __!l!!day of

/r1..a.x- L--k.

, 2015.
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CERTIFICATE OF NOTIFICATION
I certify that a copy of the attached document was sent to the following
people for case 131401508 by the method and on the date specified.
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Utah Code§ 77-38a-102
77-38a-102. Definitions.
As used in this chapter:
(1)

"Conviction" includes a:
(a)

judgment of guilt;

(b)

a plea of guilty; or

(c)

a plea of no contest.

(2)
"Criminal activities" means any offense of which the defendant is convicted or any
other criminal conduct for which the defendant admits responsibility to the sentencing
court with or without an admission of committing the criminal conduct.
(3)

"Department" means the Department of Corrections.

(4)
"Diversion" means suspending criminal proceedings prior to conviction on the
condition that a defendant agree to participate in a rehabilitation program, make
restitution to the victim, or fulfill some other condition.
(5)

"Party" means the prosecutor, defendant, or department involved in a prosecution.

(6)
"Pecuniary damages" means all demonstrable economic injury, whether or not yet
incurred, which a person could recover in a civil action arising out of the facts or events
constituting the defendant's criminal activities and includes the fair market value of
property taken, destroyed, broken, or otherwise harmed, and losses including lost
earnings and medical expenses, but excludes punitive or exemplary damages and pain
and suffering.
(7)
"Plea agreement" means an agreement entered between the prosecution and
defendant setting forth the special terms and conditions and criminal charges upon which
the defendant will enter a plea of guilty or no contest.
(8)
"Plea disposition" means an agreement entered into between the prosecution and
defendant including diversion, plea agreement, plea in abeyance agreement, or any
agreement by which the defendant may enter a plea in any other jurisdiction or where
charges are dismissed without a plea.

(9)
"Plea in abeyance" means an order by a court, upon motion of the prosecution and
the defendant, accepting a plea of guilty or of no contest from the defendant but not, at
that time, entering judgment of conviction against him nor imposing sentence upon him
on condition that he comply with specific conditions as set forth in a plea in abeyance
agreement.
(10) "Plea in abeyance agreement 11 means an agreement entered into between the
prosecution and the defendant setting forth the specific terms and conditions upon which,
following acceptance of the agreement by the court, a plea may be held in abeyance.
(11) "Restitution" means full, partial, or nominal payment for pecuniary damages to a
victim, including prejudgment interest, the accrual of interest from the time of
sentencing, insured damages, reimbursement for payment of a reward, and payment for
expenses to a governmental entity for extradition or transportation and as may be further
defined by law.
(12)
(a)

"Reward" means a sum of money:
offered to the public for information leading to the arrest and
(i)
conviction of an offender; and
(ii)
that has been paid to a person or persons who provide this
information, except that the person receiving the payment may not be a
codefendant, an accomplice, or a bounty hunter.

(b)
"Reward" does not include any amount paid in excess of the sum offered to
the public.
(13) "Screening" means the process used by a prosecuting attorney to terminate
investigative action, proceed with prosecution, move to dismiss a prosecution that has
been commenced, or cause a prosecution to be diverted.

(14)
(a)
"Victim" means any person or entity, including the Utah Office for Victims
of Crime, who the court determines has suffered pecuniary damages as a result of
the defendant's criminal activities.

(b)

"Victim" may not include a codefendant or accomplice.

Amended by Chapter 14 7, 2015 General Session

Utah Code §77-38a-202

77-38a-202. Restitution determination -- Prosecution duties and responsibilities.

( 1)
At the time of entry of a conviction or entry of any plea disposition of a felony or
class A misdemeanor, the attorney general, county attorney, municipal attorney, or
district attorney shall provide to the district court:
(a)

the names of all victims, including third parties, asserting claims for restitution;

(b)

the actual or estimated amount of restitution determined at that time; and

(c)
whether or not the defendant has agreed to pay the restitution specified as part of
the plea disposition.
(2)
In computing actual or estimated restitution, the attorney general, county attorney,
municipal attorney, or district attorney shall:
(a)
use the criteria set forth in Section 77-38a-302 for establishing restitution
amounts; and
(b)
in cases involving multiple victims, incorporate into any conviction or plea
disposition all claims for restitution arising out of the investigation for which the
defendant is charged.
(3)
If charges are not to be prosecuted as part of a plea disposition, restitution claims
from victims of those crimes shall also be provided to the court.
(4)

(a)
The attorney general, county attorney, municipal attorney, or district attorney may
be authorized by the appropriate public treasurer to deposit restitution collected on behalf
of crime victims into an interest bearing account in accordance with Title 51, Chapter 7,
State Money Management Act, pending distribution of the funds.
(b)
In the event restitution funds are deposited in an interest bearing account as
provided under Subsection (4)(a), the attorney general, county attorney, municipal
attorney, or district attorney shall:
(i)
distribute any interest that accrues in the account to each crime victim on a pro
rata basis; and

(ii)
if all crime victims have been made whole and funds remain, distribute any
remaining funds to the state Division of Finance for deposit to the Utah Office for
Victims of Crime.
(c)
This section does not prevent an independent judicial authority from collecting,
holding, and distributing restitution.
Amended by Chapter 13 I, 2011 General Session

